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Abstract 
 
JAN ROVNY: The Content and Nature of Political Competition in Europe: 
Conceptualizing Political Space and Axis of Party Competition  
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
This paper aims to address how political competition can be theoretically comprehended, 
and what accounts for the variance in the content of political competition in different 
European polities. To answer these questions, it builds on spatial theory of politics, and 
develops two additional concepts: political space and axis of competition. Political space 
is understood as a landscape of contested political issues, which combine into a small 
number of dimensions, while the axis of competition depicts the particular combination 
of issues disputed in a given political system. After conceptualizing these terms, the 
paper addresses the empirical expression of political space and axis of competition in 
Europe. Finally, this work analyzes individual vote choice, underlining the linkage 
between individual political preferences and the variation of axes of competition across 
the European continent.  
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I. Introduction  
 
European Union countries face a comparable set of socio-economic challenges: from 
rationalization of the welfare systems and generation of economic growth and 
employment, to absorption of immigrant communities and the granting of legal rights to 
minorities with alternate life-styles. Despite these general similarities, a striking feature 
of politics in Europe is the diversity of political competition present in its political 
systems. While in some countries political contest occurs primarily over economic 
policy, the political debate in others centers on issues such as protection of national 
culture and state sovereignty.  
 
This paper aims to address how political competition can be theoretically comprehended, 
and what accounts for the variance in the content of European political contestation. To 
answer these questions, this paper builds on spatial theory of political competition, and 
develops two additional concepts: political space and axis of competition in the opening 
theoretical section. The second section of this work turns to the empirical expression of 
the axis of competition in Europe. The third section serves as a demonstration of the 
conceptual framework. It performs a multinomial logit analysis on individual vote choice, 
linking the variation of competition axes to electoral competition.   
  
The paper argues for understanding political competition in the light of political space 
and axis of competition. It emphasizes that the particular content of competition stems 
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from the interaction of supply and demand factors, the interplay between individual 
preferences and party strategies. There is a connection between the nature of party 
competition expressed by the slope of the competition axis and the particular issues that 
individual voters consider when selecting a political party. Consequently, where party 
competition unfolds along an economic dimension, voters consider major political parties 
on the basis of their economic inclinations, while where political contest occurs along a 
social dimension, social issues play a more significant role in vote choice for major 
parties. Minor parties, somewhat marginalized in the political system, seek to highlight 
other issues, competing for votes along secondary dimensions or non-policy issues.  
  
II. Conceptualizing Political Space and Axis of Competition 
1. Political Space and Axis of Competition  
A schematic systematization of political competition has been initially conceptualized by 
spatial theory (Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957). This theory depicts political contest in uni-
dimensional terms as a single continuum on which each point denotes a specific 
preference position. This allows one to represent the positioning of different political 
actors such as individuals, social groups, party activists and political parties (Aldrich 
1983, Chappel and Keetch 1986, Cox 1990, Strom 1990). It assumes that each actor has a 
defined utility function over the given issue, which has a single maximum ideal point, 
outlining the most preferred policy position. These ideal maxima of individuals can be 
aggregated into a distribution of ideal points (Aldrich 1983: 957). Individuals are 
assumed to prefer positions, which are closer to their ideal point. Political actors thus 
compete for the support of individuals by placing themselves on particular positions, so 
as to attract the greatest following possible.   
 
While this theoretical simplification has been useful in depicting and understanding 
political conflict in strategic terms, it lacks the ability to address the particular ideological 
character of political competition. The structure of the uni-dimensional space is 
secondary and is merely assumed for the purposes of analyzing the strategic interaction 
among actors. As a result, spatial analysis places political conflict into a generic 
dimension commonly termed ‘left-right,’ without addressing its content. More 
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importantly, spatial theory atomizes political competition into incomparable uni-
dimensional spaces. It addresses the interplay of political actors along a continuum, yet 
this continuum is not placed in a wider spatial context. The resulting strategic analysis 
may prove similar across different political systems, while concealing extensive 
differences in the political substance contested. This denies the capacity to compare – so 
central to political analysis. 
 
To better understand the content and nature of political contestation, I propose to 
conceptualize political competition with the aid of two concepts: political space and axis 
of competition. These concepts borrow from spatial theory by assuming that politics is 
structured around political issues over which individuals hold particular preferences, 
which can be aggregated into ideal maxima, and actors such as parties compete for their 
support. Diverging from classical spatial theory, these concepts assume no particular 
distribution of ideal points, permitting skewed or bi-modal preference curves. Most 
importantly, these concepts relax the uni-dimensional conception of politics by allowing 
small-n dimensions of political competition.  
 
Political space describes the landscape of political issues which are contested in a given 
society. It outlines the particular political issue-components, which arise in various 
political systems, and thus delimits the dimensions of the ideological arena in which 
political parties can position themselves and compete for support. Due to its capacity of 
outlining party positioning, it retains the ability to depict strategic competition among 
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parties, while simultaneously providing a comparable ideological backdrop by 
summarizing the dimensional structure in a particular political system.      
 
The axis of competition1 is the political pathway along which contending interests collide.  
It is a theoretical aide in the location of political competition in political space. It is a path 
of political conflict over the political landscape of a given society – a line of political 
interaction between political actors. As such it is a summary of the main fault line in a 
society, which anchors political competition, highlighting the structure behind spatial 
positioning of political parties. Parties may position themselves throughout the political 
space of their polities, exploiting the bounds of all possible dimensional combinations. 
Or, parties may seek to connect various dimensions by aligning along a particular 
dimensional arrangement. The axis of party competition outlines the particular 
correlation between the standing dimensions as political actors contest them. The 
competition axis is not created intentionally. It is rather a byproduct of the interaction 
between individual partisan ideologies and strategic considerations, leading to an 
unintended equilibrium. Since competition axes are expressions of the particular 
ideological competition structure of given societies, they can be meaningfully compared 
across cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 This concept was introduced without detailed conceptualization by Kitschelt (1994), and is developed in 
Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards (2006).  
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Figure 1. Axis of Competition in two-dimensional Political Space 
In the left panel, parties position themselves in all four quadrants of two-dimensional political space. There 
is no correlation between dimension X and Y and no discernible axis of party competition. In the right 
panel, parties align along a competition axis, which depicts the correlation between dimension X and Y.  
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2. Political Competition and Dimensionality 
Political space – the stage for political conflict – outlines the important political issues 
and their dimensionality in a particular society. It is in this space where parties take 
positions, paving the competition axis as a path of political contest. A path not 
collectively premeditated, but rather gradually treaded out by self-regarding actors.  
 
It is important to inquire further into what determines the structure of political space and 
how particular dimensions of political conflict are created. I propose an answer which lies 
in the interaction between political demand and political supply. Political space and 
competition axis are on the one hand defined by the demand rooted in social interests and 
divides over political concerns. On the other hand, they are also shaped by the supply 
embodied in the strategic responses of political parties who represent and exploit these 
rifts.  
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All politics begins with issues – basic concerns of citizens. Theoretically speaking, there 
exists an almost infinite number of political issues, which concern individual members of 
society. These are the basic preferences determining citizens’ views on particular policy 
options, such as: the level of taxation, severity of punishment for violent crimes, the 
extent of rights that various minorities get to enjoy and so on. Individuals hold varying 
position over these issues, and their aggregates produce various preference distributions. 
This emphasizes Sartori’s point about the ‘disjointed’ nature of political space (Sartori 
1976: 343), where some individuals or political actors, which have relatively proximate 
positioning, nevertheless, find each other’s preferences unacceptable, which can be 
depicted by steeply changing preference distribution curves.     
 
In addition to positioning, individuals care about different issues with different intensity.2 
Salience – measuring the importance of a given issue – is thus modeled as a weight of a 
particular position on the issue continuum, which can again be aggregated to derive an 
overall salience of a given issue. A political actor has only a finite amount of salience, 
which can be distributed over a number of different issues. Individuals – given their 
bounded cognitive capacity – can thus care about and political parties – given their finite 
political and financial resources – can publicize only a restricted number of issues, with 
the allocation of salience across these issues representing a zero-sum tradeoff. 
 
                                                
2 The concern with ‘intensity’ of interest on a given issue is adopted from the directional voting model 
(MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1989, MacDonald Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991). Although this model 
proposes an entirely different conceptualization of political space, it provides a solid argument for the need 
to incorporate salience. 
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Cleavages appear on issues on which large number of individuals holds different views, 
while assigning relatively significant salience levels to them. Cleavages thus represent 
deep and long-standing rifts in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), which are manifested 
by social rootedness and political organization.3 Daalder underlines that cleavages need 
not be characterized only by sharp distinctions in positioning, where two adversarial 
groups stand on opposing sides with a valley of empty space between them (a bi-modal 
distribution). On the contrary, many political divisions can and do have meaningful 
intermediate (centrist) positions (Daalder 1984: 104). As such, the particular distribution 
of aggregated individual positions on salient and divisive issues provides a panorama of 
social interest, representing the demand for political solutions.   
 
Political parties respond to this political demand. Through its appeals to voters and the 
development of a political program, a party aggregates political interests. These are 
collected firstly on the basis of the party supporters’ proximate positioning on individual 
issues, and secondly across different issues which party followers care about. This leads 
to the creation of coherent parcels of political values. This development of simplified 
political packages is synonymous with the creation of political dimensions. Dimensions – 
the bundles of issues on which actor positioning is more or less tightly correlated – which 
are the unintentional consequences of partisan struggle for political support, are thus the 
building blocks of political space.  
 
The interaction between citizens’ political demands based on their issue preferences, and 
parties seeking to represent them, leads to the creation of political space through the 
                                                
3 For a ‘lighter’ understanding of cleavages see Zielinski 2002: 189. 
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inadvertent development of issue dimensions. These dimensions create the political 
landscape in which parties position themselves to compete for votes. This positioning by 
which parties seek to maximize their individual utilities, potentially results in the 
formation of a competition axis.  
 
Political parties, however, enjoy formative powers over the structure of political space, 
since they are the actors that direct the translation of political issues into dimensions. 
When aggregating political issues into dimensions, a political party faces an inherent 
tension. On the one hand, a party seeks to reflect and voice the diversity of salient 
political issues, which leads it to formulate an increased number of distinct and tightly 
associated political packages (made of very highly correlated issues), thus inducing an 
increase in the dimensionality of political space. This is strategically advantageous for the 
party since augmented dimensional complexity allows for greater ideological nuance, 
which enables the party to differentiate itself from other competitors, and to tap 
specialized interest support. 
 
On the other hand, such disaggregation increases political complexity, leading to 
considerable costs to a political party. Firstly, convolution of political space through 
increased dimensionality entails cognitive costs to a party, which needs to track or 
develop positioning along multiple continua. This ultimately restrains the party’s function 
as a political simplifier. Secondly, increased dimensionality introduces systemic 
instability. It provides multiple planes of party competition, making equilibrium positions 
increasingly difficult – if not impossible – to reach. Systems with high dimensionality can 
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thus be expected to be systems of greater flux, which defeats a party’s aim of achieving 
and maintaining power. Finally, increased dimensionality introduces heightened 
campaign costs. Parties, like most organizations, are entities with histories, having 
developed their structures, identifications and reputations over time. (Marks and 
Steenbergen 2002: 881-2) A party is likely to be ideologically and organizationally 
invested in specific positioning on distinctive dimensions.  The rise of a new dimension 
or a change in the aggregation of issues within a standing dimension leads to loss of 
recognition of the party’s positioning, and increases costs associated with the need to 
divert salience to the new dimensions. Also, newly emergent dimensions my reconfigure 
the bundling of political issues in such a way that an incumbent party finds itself 
internally divided on certain issues. Clearly, if such issues carry significant salience, the 
unity of the party becomes seriously jeopardized. As a result, each political party – 
especially an established one – prefers to maintain a stable dimensional configuration of 
political space.  
 
The dimensional structure of political space thus exerts varying impact on different types 
of political parties. A party established in a given set of dimensions benefits from the 
status quo. The dimensions revolve around issues on which this party has clearly 
articulated positions and a recognized record, which serves as a carrier of its ideological 
image. Such a party focuses on defining political conflict through the prisms of the 
standing dimensions – dimensions that provide it with stable electorates, as well as a 
predictable set of coalition partners (Strom 1990: 585). Conversely, a party that is 
marginal on the predominating set of political dimensions – thus representing infrequent 
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positioning on the relevant issues – endures reduced power in the system. This party 
musters limited number of votes and suffers from reduced bargaining capacity in the 
system (Strom 1990: 585). Its best strategic option is to exploit new issues on which its 
(mainstream) opponents might have no determined positions, or – even better – which 
may internally divide the opposing camps (Daalder 1984: 100).  
 
As a result, political competition is a struggle over the dimensional configuration of 
political space, determining the content of political debate, as well as the political 
crevices in which different parties may dwell. A political party tries to manipulate the 
dimensional structure to its advantage.4 Particularly, a marginal party attempts to invest 
salience into new issues that are orthogonal to the standing dimensions of political space 
(Meguid 2005). This essentially reorganizes the structure of political space, increasing its 
dimensionality, and thus escalating the potential for specialized parties. This relates to 
Sartori’s ‘centrifugal competition’, where extreme parties seek to ‘tear the system apart’ 
(Sartori 1976: 350). Such strategies force the mainstream parties to react by either 
ignoring the new issue, or in case it does garner significant salience among the electorate, 
to try and translate it into the standing set of dimensions. The mainstream parties are thus 
strategically interested in adjoining the new issue into the structure of current dimensions. 
This is only possible if the ideal point variation on this issue is distributed in such a way 
that it correlates with the issues currently contained in the predominant dimensions, or, if 
the new issue is indeed orthogonal (and thus no correlation exists) the established parties 
have the strategic capacity to align this issue with the traditional dimensions forcibly. If, 
                                                
4 For an example from American politics see Miller and Schofield (2003).  
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however, the new issue drives a crosscutting wedge inside the mainstream parties, they 
may splinter along this issue, which eventually becomes an additional dimension.  
  
Table 1. Determinants of Political Space Dimensionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Demand 
Social Factors 
Individual Preference Distribution 
- Modality 
o if more than one mode, the deeper the rift  
- Variance 
o the greater the variance, the deeper the rift 
Issue Correlation  
- ceteris paribus the more issues on which individual positioning 
correlates, the lower the dimensionality  
Political Supply  
Partisan Factors 
Response to Demand 
- Preference Distribution and Correlation  
o Parties respond to aggregate preference distribution over 
dimensions  
Relation to other Suppliers (parties)   
- Distance  
o Parties aim to distinguish themselves from other 
competitors. They seek to distance themselves on at least 
one dimension  
Dimension Construction 
- the more a new issue correlates with established ones, the easier its 
translation into standing dimensions  
 
 
 
 
III. Political Space and Axis of Competition in Europe  
The structure of political conflict in Europe has been primarily theorized by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), who argue that contemporary political competition in Europe results 
from successive incorporations of divisive concerns stemming from national and 
industrial revolutions, which have occurred on the continent in the past centuries. The 
authors argue for the fundamental role of the cleavage splitting workers versus owners, 
which has had a strong homogenizing effect on European polities (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967: 35, 47). In recent decades, the internationalization of production and capital 
markets has undermined the capacity of governments to coordinate markets and to ensure 
sufficient levels of national investment. This has in turn led to slowing growth and 
increased unemployment, placing strain on public finances and undermining the solvency 
of welfare systems (Huber and Stephens 2001: 318). Similarly, the changing structure of 
production, shifting from industrial manufacturing towards a service oriented economy, 
has differentiated economic stratification and altered the capacity of labour 
representation. De-industrialization has thus induced the re-emergence of distributional 
issues on the political agenda (Iversen in Pierson 2001: 78-9). Consequently, the 
changing structure of economic production has deepened a rift between the skilled and 
educated who have improved their capacity of social, as well as geographic, mobility and 
those with lower education and skills who face increasing socio-economic uncertainty 
and limited capacity of exit. Distributional conflict has thus defined the economic nature 
of the prime dimension of European political space. 
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Although few would question the central role of economic conflict in European politics, 
recent scholarship has outlined the growing impact of non-economic factors on political 
competition. Due to pervasive stabilization of political and economic regimes, leading to 
unprecedented levels of general affluence and increasing social ‘embourgeoisement,’ 
mobility and facilitated access to information, the tenacity of class conflict has been 
somewhat dulled. Post-war generations expressed increased interest in self-expression 
and in issues pertaining to life-quality and life-style rather than to material concerns 
(Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984: 15-18, Inglehart 1984, 1997). Recent decades have 
also seen the rise of threats to individual and group identity. The changing ethnic makeup 
of European societies resulting from persistent levels of immigration from the third world 
has placed emphasis on questions of national culture and identity. The visible presence of 
minorities and minority cultures in most Western European societies has fuelled intense 
debates concerning the level to which immigrant cultures should integrate into the 
predominant culture, polarizing the society between those favouring cosmopolitanism 
versus assimilation. In a different vein, ongoing European integration with its 
simultaneous increase of the powers of supranational institutions in Brussels while 
devolving some decision-making towards the regional level has engendered questions 
concerning the role and sovereignty of the European national state. Contemporary 
developments have thus ignited a virulent political rift on issues related to general social 
concerns, emphasizing the two-dimensional nature of European politics.  
 
Consequently, scholars have defined contemporary European party competition in two-
dimensions generally spanning from economic redistribution to market allocation on the 
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one hand, and from libertarian or alternative politics to authoritarian or traditional politics 
on the other (Kitschelt 1992, Hooghe Marks and Wilson 2002, Kitschelt 2003, Marks 
Hooghe Edwards and Nelson 2006). These authors further contend a linkage between 
these dimensions, whereby in Western Europe redistributive economic positioning 
corresponds with socially liberal politics – thus outlining an axis of competition. In 
Eastern Europe, where opposition to communist redistributive and authoritarian rule has 
structured post-communist politics, the same dimensions exist. The axis of competition 
has, however, the opposite slope, linking traditionalism and authoritarianism with the 
economically redistributive left (Vachudova and Hooghe 2006). 
 
Quantitative data yields striking confirmation of the postulated relationship between the 
two major dimensions and the differences between the regions of Europe. The 2002 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey underlines the consistent structure of party competition. 
Firstly, political parties do not seem to place themselves ‘randomly’ within the political 
space, but rather along discernible competition axes which link the positioning on the two 
dimensions. Secondly, while in Western Europe the competition axis has a negative 
slope, in Eastern Europe the axis runs in the opposite direction (see Marks Hooghe 
Edwards and Nelson 2006, Vachudova and Hooghe 2006).  
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Figure 2. Political Space and Axes of Party Competition in Europe 
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Dimension X – Economic Left-Right, Dimension Y – Green/Liberal/Alternative politics versus 
Traditional/Nationalist/Authoritarian (see Hooghe Marks and Wilson 2002). Line fit is based on OLS 
regression, weighted by party vote. This is a replication of results reported by Vachudova and Hooghe 
(2006). 
 
The generalized quantitative expression of the axis of party competition emphasizes the 
diverse character of the political contestation in different European countries. While the 
Czech, Greek, Latvian and Swedish party systems seem to compete predominantly along 
the economic dimension (their competition axes have a flat slope), the party systems of 
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Austria, France, Spain, the UK and especially Hungary seem to compete predominantly 
along the social dimension (their competition axes have a steep slope).5 This confirmed 
observation begs the question: why? The following section provides one test of 
explaining the slope of the competition axis.  
Table 2. Slopes and Fit Measures of Competition Axes in Europe 
Estimates of are obtained using OLS regression. Significance is not reported since the aim is to obtain best 
line fit of the positioning of the population of parties. This is a replication of results reported by Vachudova 
and Hooghe (2006)  
 
 
                                                
5 The precise expression of the ‘flatness’ or ‘steepness’ of the competition axis is the absolute value of the 
axis slope, where a large absolute value suggests competition along the vertical (social) axis, while a small 
absolute value suggests competition along the horizontal (economic) axis.  
 Unweighted model  Model weighted by vote 
Country Adjusted R2 Slope  Root MSE  R2 Slope Root MSE 
BE 0.444 -0.792 1.864 0.390 -0.678 2.026 
DK 0.174 -0.718 2.401 0.167 -0.385 2.082 
GE -0.181 -0.218 2.255 0.162 -0.425 1.782 
GR -0.482 -0.090 2.472 0.241 -0.464 1.691 
ESP 0.905 -0.881 0.500 0.974 -1.041 0.359 
FR 0.269 -0.724 2.186 0.598 -1.418 1.802 
IRL -0.167 -0.186 1.927 0.219 -0.445 1.489 
IT 0.459 -0.802 1.513 0.402 -0.634 1.787 
NL 0.209 -0.641 2.607 0.386 -0.555 1.780 
UK 0.515 -0.777 1.440 0.920 -1.264 0.766 
POR 0.889 -0.930 1.040 0.932 -0.977 0.793 
AUS 0.357 -1.097 2.806 0.937 -1.283 0.902 
FIN 0.074 -0.544 1.996 0.263 -0.526 1.714 
SV -0.067 -0.249 1.937 0.015 -0.073 1.587 
BUL 0.254 0.398 0.893 0.769 0.560 0.558 
CZECH -0.073 0.313 2.386 0.229 0.290 1.954 
HUNG 0.783 2.858 1.440 0.666 3.549 1.796 
LAT -0.126 0.112 1.448 0.007 0.032 1.081 
LITH 0.753 0.733 0.945 0.797 0.775 0.918 
POL 0.032 0.531 3.077 0.128 0.557 3.130 
ROM 0.746 0.964 1.160 0.697 0.926 1.406 
SLOVAK 0.007 0.313 1.946 0.141 0.338 1.781 
SLOVEN -0.152 0.241 1.920 0.270 1.002 1.729 
 
 
 
 
IV. Vote Choice and the Slope of Party Competition Axis   
1. Propositions and Hypotheses 
The nature of political competition, and thus the slope of the competition axis, is a 
function of political demand. Individual preference distribution and the salience of 
particular political issues serve as a popular level incubator for political conflict. As a 
result, decisions in the electoral marketplace – taken against the backdrop of the primary 
social cleavages – determine the pathway of political contestation. Parties respond to 
citizens’ concerns and position themselves in the political space in such a way, as to 
represent the popular preference and salience distribution. The competition axis slope 
thus results from the popular importance assigned to and variance on political issues.  
 
Consequently, partisan choice for the major contenders in elections is based on the 
predominant dimension of conflict as expressed by the axis of party competition slope. 
This is not to deny partial role of party identities in vote choice – that is, for example that 
social conservatism determines the vote for right-wing parties, whereas say positioning 
on issues of economic redistribution predicts the vote for the center-left. However, the 
particular structure of political conflict of a society – the path of political interaction 
depicted by the slope of the competition axis – reflects vote choice across the party 
system. Voters tend to support the main political parties, those competing for government 
control, based on the consideration of the predominant dimension along which domestic 
conflict runs. 
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These causes for party axis slope are further reinforced by political strategies of parties. 
The effects of partisan co-existence in political space are not uniform across political 
actors. Major mainstream parties, who are likely to have longstanding roots in the 
society, as well as organization apparatuses and linkages within political institutions, face 
much higher sunk costs of reputation and identity creation. It is these parties that strive 
for the Lipset-Rokkanian ‘freezing’ of party systems along a stable competition axis 
inhabited by strategically sluggish actors (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50). Since these 
parties are likely to be the historical co-creators of the character of their domestic 
political space; since these parties are ideologically invested in the primary political fault 
lines (along which the competition axis runs); it is these parties that compete along the 
predominant dimensions of the political system.  
Hypothesis 1: The primary dimension of political conflict determines vote choice 
for major political parties. Where the axis of competition is steep, conflict over 
social issues determines the relationship between major parties and vice versa.  
 
Minor parties, on the contrary, suffer from reduced impact in the standing competitive 
construction of their political space. While the competition axis is a conduit for political 
skirmishes between the major parties, secondary political parties seek to avoid being 
caught in the crossfire, and aim to step aside. As a result, they tend to stand further away 
from the axis of competition, attempting to compete on more peripheral dimensions. 
Given the pervasiveness of the primary conflict, these parties are unlikely to not compete 
along the main dimension at all, but they face strategic incentives in emphasizing the less 
important dimension. The source of their political identity is the differentiation from the 
major parties along the inferior dimensions, or along non-policy issues, such as valence 
or anti-systemic orientation. Minor parties thus try to increase the salience of tangential 
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issues, which may distract voters from the primary dimension, thus reducing the 
dominance of major parties.  
Hypothesis 2: The secondary dimension of political conflict plays a greater role in 
determining vote choice for minor political parties. Where the axis of competition 
is steep economic conflict increasingly co-determines the vote for minor parties 
and vice versa.  
 
2. Analysis and Results  
In order to test the above hypotheses, I use data from the World Value Surveys (1999-
2002). They offer a useful database comprising of individual level observations, 
providing positioning on a large number of political issues such as the role of the state in 
the economy, justifiability of homosexuality or abortion, or the role of religion in society, 
as well as general socio-economic indicators, such as age, education, income or size of 
community of residence. Importantly, this data overlaps with the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey data – used for the above derivation of the structure of political space – in 
temporal terms, making it a reasonable analytical pair. To address my propositions, I 
concentrate on the cases of extreme party competition axis slope on the European 
continent – both in Eastern and Western Europe. Due to space limitations, I constrain 
myself to analyzing four cases, two with a flat competition axis – Sweden and the Czech 
Republic, and two with a steep competition axis – Austria and Hungary.  
 
To assess the structure of the data, I initially perform principal factor analysis. I impose 
orthogonality of factors by performing varimax rotation. This produces factors, which 
can be easily analytically categorized. In Sweden, as well as in the Czech Republic, two 
principle factors emerge, one ‘economic’ – related to the role of government in the 
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economy and individual responsibility – and another ‘social’ – related to issues of 
alternative lifestyles and religiosity. In Austria and Hungary three principle factors 
emerge, one ‘economic’ pertaining to similar issues of government control of the 
economy, and two general ‘social’ factors where one is specifically related to the role of 
religion in society and the other to social-moral issues, such as homosexuality, abortion 
and soft-drug use. These resulting factors are used as the predictors of interest in 
analyzing vote choice in the four countries. (See Appendix for factor loadings.) 
 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I perform multinomial logit analysis (MNL), predicting 
individual party vote choice by individual positioning on the pertinent factors of the 
given country, while controlling for the effects of socio-economic characteristics, such as 
age, education, income and community size. I assess the distinctive factors behind vote 
choice for various major and minor parties, and to interpret these results I evaluate the 
change in vote probability for various parties as a function of the different factors.    
 
The results show that the estimated models provide a reasonable explanation of vote 
choice, providing Likelihood-Ratio tests significant at the .001 level. Interestingly, the 
models for Sweden and the Czech Republic have substantially higher pseudo R2 (.2165 
and .1339) as opposed to the models for Austria and Hungary (.0969 and .0892). Despite 
the differences, all of these values are somewhat small, suggesting that the models 
explain only a limited portion of vote choice variance. Although it is surprising that 
issue-positioning together with socio-economic factors provide such constrained 
explanation, it is likely that the weakness of the model stems from the omission of non-
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policy issues such as the perception of politicians’ valence and subjective identification 
with a political party6. In all cases, assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
seems to hold based on both the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests, suggesting the 
appropriateness of using a MNL model. 
 
In the case of Sweden, I estimate an MNL model using choice for five of the larger 
parties of the 2002 Swedish parliamentary elections – the Moderaterna, SAP, 
Folkepartiet, Kristdemokraterna and Vänstrepartiet – as the dependent variable. As 
predictors I use individual positioning on the economic and social factors, which were 
derived from the factor analysis. To control for socio-economic characteristics, I add 
variables for age, level of education, capacity to save money in the past year, socio-
economic status and income level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 For the importance of these factors for political competition see Adams and Merrill (1999), and Adams 
(2001) 
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Table 3. Multinomial Logit – Sweden 
 Vänstrep. Folkep. Moderat. Kristdem. 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Economic Factor .7276*** -0.2253 -2.047*** -.9451** 
 -0.2182 -0.2872 -0.2694 -0.2981 
Social Factor .8611** -0.0040 -0.1242 -.7955** 
 -0.2628 -0.2876 -0.2206 -0.2480 
Age -0.0134 -0.0066 0.0011 0.0100 
 -0.0119 -0.0128 -0.0102 -0.0127 
Education Level 0.0345 .5547*** .2680** 0.1918 
 -0.1071 -0.1435 -0.1003 -0.1210 
Saving Money 0.0843 -0.0645 0.0764 0.1180 
 -0.1921 -0.2528 -0.2054 -0.2353 
Soc-Econ Status 0.2832 -.8500** -.7640*** -0.3735 
 -0.1933 -0.2781 -0.2101 -0.2371 
Income -0.0309 -0.0410 0.0045 0.0607 
 -0.0728 -0.0809 -0.0686 -0.0854 
Constant -1.4389 -1.7842 -0.7082 -2.5900 
 -1.1453 -1.3807 -1.1173 -1.3800 
Log-likelihood -466.9700    
Chi2 258.0704    
Pseudo R2 0.2165    
Baseline SAP    
N 401    
 *p<.05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
The substantive results of the model generally support the posited hypotheses. The choice 
for the two major political competitors, the social-democratic SAP and the conservative 
Moderaterna, is primarily determined by economic issues.7 The probability of voting for 
Moderaterna decreases by over 80% as individual placement on the economic factor goes 
from its minimal value (economic-right) to its maximal value (economic left). Similarly, 
the probability of vote for the SAP increases by over 25% as the positioning on the 
economic factor goes from extreme right to extreme left. Furthermore, the effect of the 
economic factor for the choice for Moderaterna and SAP is statistically significant vis-à-
vis all other possible choices, emphasizing its impact on the vote for them. On the 
contrary the effect of the social factor for these parties is very weak, resulting in only a 
                                                
7 A Wald test leads to a sound rejection of the null hypothesis that neither factor has any effect on vote 
choice.   
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small vote probability change of 2% and 11% respectively. It is also not statistically 
significant with respect to most other party choices (the exceptions are the Vänstrepartiet 
and Kristdemokraterna).    
Table 4. Vote Probability Change – Sweden 
 Vänstrep. Folkep. Moderat. Kristdem. SAP Change 
Economic Factor 0.622 0.016 -0.820 -0.073 0.255 0.357 
Social Factor 0.311 0.025 -0.020 -0.429 0.113 0.180 
Age 0.079 -0.034 0.023 0.071 0.018 0.045 
Education Level -0.058 0.209 0.154 0.038 -0.344 0.161 
Saving Money 0.016 -0.028 0.028 0.030 -0.046 0.030 
Soc-Econ Status 0.192 -0.147 -0.277 -0.045 0.277 0.188 
Income 0.030 -0.039 0.008 0.062 -0.001 0.028 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ command 
 
The results for the minor parties are much more varied. Some of these parties are clearly 
chosen for reasons of individual economic positioning. They are, however, also selected 
on the basis of other features – suggesting that they strive for competition on other 
dimensions. The radical-left Vänstrepartiet depends for its votes on individual positioning 
on economic issues, but placement on the social factor importantly codetermines the vote. 
It is statistically significant and its absolute discrete change results in 31% of vote 
probability change. The confessional Kristdemokraterna relies on positioning on the 
social factor even more clearly. It is highly statistically significant between all categories 
and when positioning on it decreases from extreme social liberalism to extreme social 
conservatism, this results in a 42% increase in vote probability. Finally, the vote for the 
liberal Folkepartiet is not successfully predictable by individual positioning on either 
factor, as both have very small substantive impact and are not statistically significant 
between most choice categories. The best predictor of vote choice for the Folkepartiet is 
age, which seems to suggest that this party markets itself more on the basis of non-policy 
issues such as youth-friendly dynamism.  
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Figure 3. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Sweden 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social factor spans from socially 
      conservative to socially liberal. Generated with Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
The Czech Republic yields very similar results. I estimate an MNL model assessing the 
choice for the five parties represented in parliament in 2002 – ODS, !SSD, KS!M, 
KDU-!SL and US. My main predictors of interest are the social and economic factor 
generated by the factor analysis, and the included control variables are age, education 
level, socio-economic status, income and size of community inhabited.  
 
The two major Czech parties – the conservative ODS and social-democratic !SSD – 
clearly compete on economic issues. The vote choice for these parties is best explained 
by individual positioning on the economic factor. Total change on this factor from its 
maximum value (economic left) to the minimum (economic right), leads to an increased 
probability of voting for ODS by as much as 62%. On the contrary, the effect of the 
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social factor is not significant vis-à-vis other choice categories, except the Christian-
democratic KDU-!SL. 
 
As in Sweden, the minor parties in the Czech Republic compete on a wider variety of 
issues. The Christian-democratic KDU-!SL differentiates itself quite clearly on social 
issues, where a total increase in the positioning on the social factor (from social 
conservatism to social liberalism) leads to a 41% lower probability of voting for KDU-
!SL. On the contrary, the vote for the liberal US cannot be determined by issue 
positioning. The most significant predictor is age, where change from the oldest (87 
years) to the youngest (17 years) respondent results in almost 28% increase in probability 
of voting for the party. This can be explained by US’s concentration on valence rather 
than policy issues, campaigning largely against the personality and leadership style of 
ODS chairman, Václav Klaus, and thus also attracting younger voters eager for change in 
political culture. The communist KS!M is an interesting case. It competes on economic 
issues where a shift from the extreme economic right to extreme economic left leads to a 
54% vote probability increase for the party. The reason for why KS!M competes in the 
main dimension, despite being a party slipping into marginality, is its original centrality 
in the system, the structure of which it has shaped. As the original communist monopoly 
party, KS!M has been the political subject around which the fledgling democratic party 
system – and its axis of competition – evolved.  
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Table 5. Multinomial Logit – Czech Republic 
 KS!M !SSD KDU-!SL US 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Social Factor 0.1829 -0.0216 -1.3074*** -0.0591 
 -0.1684 -0.1281 -0.2050 -0.1532 
Economic Factor 1.5893*** 1.019*** 0.4349 0.2290 
 -0.1845 -0.1510 -0.2237 -0.1913 
Age .0501*** .0136* 0.0006 -.0276*** 
 -0.0091 -0.0066 -0.0094 -0.0082 
Education Level 0.0108 .1578732* 0.0300 0.1470 
 -0.0858 -0.0658 -0.0972 -0.0763 
Soc-Econ Status 0.3884 .3806* 0.0478 0.1596 
 -0.2313 -0.1778 -0.2603 -0.2081 
Income -0.0754 -0.0381 -0.0118 -0.0030 
 -0.0568 -0.0407 -0.0608 -0.0464 
Community Size -0.0582 -0.0665 -0.0740 0.0854 
 -0.0557 -0.0435 -0.0638 -0.0537 
Constant -3.9698*** -1.9730* -1.6212 -1.1863 
 -1.1091 -0.8177 -1.2019 -0.9212 
Log-Likelihood -1025.7660    
Chi2 317.1457    
Pseudo R2 0.1339    
Base Category ODS    
N 790    
 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Table 6. Vote Probability Change – Czech Republic 
 KS!M !SSD 
KDU-
!SL ODS US Change 
Social Factor 0.1113 0.1104 -0.4140 0.1615 0.0308 0.1656 
Economic Factor  0.5442 0.2580 -0.0443 -0.6213 -0.1365 0.3209 
Age 0.3685 0.0977 -0.0272 -0.1597 -0.2792 0.1864 
Education Level -0.0432 0.1831 -0.0194 -0.1871 0.0666 0.0999 
Soc-Econ Status 0.0640 0.1817 -0.0287 -0.2055 -0.0114 0.0982 
Income -0.0493 -0.0485 0.0055 0.0716 0.0206 0.0391 
Community Size -0.0270 -0.0983 -0.0261 0.0555 0.0961 0.0606 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ 
command 
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Figure 4. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Czech Republic 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social factor spans from socially 
      conservative to socially liberal. Generated with Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
 
Turning to Austria, I estimate an MNL model using choice for the four parties, which 
entered the Federal Council in 2002 – the SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and Grünen – as the 
dependent variable. I concentrate on the individual positioning on the three issue factors 
generated by the factor analysis – social-moral, economic and religious – as the main 
predictors. To control for socio-economic characteristics, I include variables of age, level 
of education, socio-economic status, income level and size of community inhabited.  
 
The results of the analysis are partly supportive of the hypotheses proposed. Vote choice 
for the two major parties – the social-democratic SPÖ and the Christian-democratic ÖVP 
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– is interestingly determined by all three factors: social-moral, economic and religious.8 It 
thus seems that the major parties compete on all relevant issue dimensions in their 
system. Clearly, party family related identities play a role, as the social-moral and 
religious factors play a more pronounced role in the vote for the Christian-oriented ÖVP. 
As, for example, an individual’s positioning on the religious factor increases from its 
minimum value (secularism) to its maximum (religious orientation), the probability of 
voting for the ÖVP increases by over 42%. Conversely, for the SPÖ it is positioning on 
economic issues that determines its selection most strongly. Change from the minimum 
value on the factor (economic right) to the maximum value (economic left) increases the 
probability of voting for the SPÖ by almost 34%. Nevertheless, the positioning on all 
three factors is statistically and substantively significant in the choice for these two major 
parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8A Wald test leads to a sound rejection of the null hypothesis that neither factor has any effect on vote 
choice.   
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Table 7. Multinomial Logit – Austria 
 
Table 8. Vote Probability Change in Austria 
 Grünen ÖVP FPÖ SPÖ Change 
Social-Moral Factor 0.224 -0.525 0.002 0.294 0.262 
Economic Factor  0.231 -0.324 -0.137 0.338 0.231 
Religious Factor 0.016 0.426 -0.143 -0.299 0.221 
Age -0.030 0.066 -0.255 0.218 0.142 
Education Level 0.195 0.153 -0.218 -0.130 0.174 
Soc-Econ Status -0.047 -0.214 0.090 0.172 0.131 
Income -0.011 0.040 -0.013 -0.015 0.020 
Community Size -0.058 -0.107 0.117 -0.007 0.058 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ 
command 
 
 
 
Baseline 
SPÖ   
Baseline 
ÖVP   
 Grünen ÖVP FPÖ Grünen SPÖ FPÖ 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Social-moral 
Factor 
.6181** -.8925*** -0.2300 1.510*** .8925*** .6625*** 
 -0.2307 -0.1617 -0.1544 -0.2447 -0.1617 -0.1767 
Economic Factor  0.2329 -.4599*** -.3187* .6928** .4599*** 0.1412 
 -0.2020 -0.1360 -0.1378 -0.2128 -0.1360 -0.1509 
Religious Factor 0.3478 .5413*** 0.0720 -0.1935 -.5413*** -.4693** 
 -0.2167 -0.1437 -0.1599 -0.2147 -0.1437 -0.1583 
Age -0.0187 -0.0050 -.0247** -0.0138 0.0050 -.0197* 
 -0.0117 -0.0073 -0.0076 -0.0120 -0.0073 -0.0080 
Education Level .4265*** 0.1268 -0.0939 .2997** -0.1268 -.2206** 
 -0.1025 -0.0683 -0.0737 -0.1049 -0.0683 -0.0769 
Soc-Econ Status -0.5124 -.3953* -0.0236 -0.1171 .3953* .3716* 
 -0.2914 -0.1624 -0.1666 -0.2991 -0.1624 -0.1795 
Income -0.0233 0.0192 -0.0017 -0.0425 -0.0192 -0.0209 
 -0.0657 -0.0437 -0.0453 -0.0674 -0.0437 -0.0482 
Community Size -0.0075 -0.0491 0.0671 0.0416 0.0491 .1162* 
 -0.0639 -0.0465 -0.0452 -0.0665 -0.0465 -0.0502 
Constant -1.4671 0.4171 0.8527 -1.8842 -0.4171 0.4356 
 -1.2402 -0.7528 -0.7876 -1.2614 -0.7528 -0.8245 
Log-likelihood -737.388   -737.388   
Chi2 231.2421   231.2421   
Pseudo R2 0.1355   0.1355   
Base Category SPÖ   ÖVP   
N 660   660   
 * p<.05 ** p<.01 
***p<.00
1 (two-tailed)   
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The two minor parties – the radical right FPÖ and the green Grünen – seem to attract 
votes less on policy issues measured here, but rather as a result of other concerns. 
Considering policy positioning, vote choice for the Grünen is most importantly 
determined by economic issues, where maximum change in individuals’ positioning on 
this factor leads to 23% vote probability change. The economic factor is, however, 
statistically significant only when considering a vote between the Grünen and the right-
wing parties – ÖVP and FPÖ). The vote choice between the SPÖ and the Grünen is more 
significantly determined by positioning on social-moral issues. The policy-based vote for 
the FPÖ is similarly determined by positioning on a combination of the economic and 
social-moral factors. In terms of policy positioning, voters differentiate between the FPÖ 
and the left-wing parties based on economic factors, while they choose to vote for the 
FPÖ over the SPÖ based on social-moral factors. More importantly, however, the vote 
choice for these minor parties is more decisively determined by non-policy issues. In the 
case of the Grünen, the effect of education level is substantively and statistically 
significant across all baseline categories. As education increases from the lowest category 
(incomplete elementary education) to the highest (university degree), the probability of 
voting for the Grünen increases by almost 20%. The impact of non-policy issues is even 
more striking in the case of the FPÖ. The most pronounced predictors of vote for the FPÖ 
are age and education level. The vote for the FPÖ seems to come more from the young 
and the less educated. As age increases from the lowest recorded value (18 years) to the 
highest (87 years), the likelihood of voting for the FPÖ decreases by over 25%. Similarly, 
as education level increases from the lowest category (incomplete elementary education) 
to the highest (university degree), vote probability for the FPÖ drops by almost 22%.      
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Figure 5. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Austria 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social-moral factor spans from social 
conservatism to social liberalism, religious factor spans from secular to religious. Generated by 
         Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
In Hungary, the results point in a similar direction. I estimate a MNL model predicting 
the vote choice for the four most significant parties in the political system in 2002 – the 
MSZP, Fidesz-MDF, SZDSZ and FKGP. I concentrate on the positioning on the three 
issue factors generated by the factor analysis – social-moral, religious and economic – as 
the main predictors, while controlling for age, education level, socio-economic status, 
income and size of community inhabited.  
 
As in Austria, the two major parties in Hungary – the social-democratic MSZP and 
conservative Fidesz-MDF – compete on a combination of social and economic issues, yet 
the two social factors are particularly significant. If, for example, the positioning on the 
religious factor changes from extreme secular to extreme religious, the probability of 
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voting for MSZP decreases by 41%, while a shift from extreme social liberalism to social 
conservatism on the social-moral factor increases the likelihood of voting for Fidesz-
MDF by 36%.  
 
 
Table 9. Multinomial Logit - Hungary 
 SZDSZ Fidesz-MDF FKGP 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Social-Moral Factor  0.2280 -.3616* 0.0526 
 -0.1991 -0.1636 -0.3334 
Religious Factor 1.060*** .4231** .5827* 
 -0.2985 -0.1611 -0.2638 
Economic Factor -0.6589 -.4349* -0.1102 
 -0.3841 -0.1825 -0.3124 
Age 0.0031 -0.0117 0.0111 
 -0.0151 -0.0074 -0.0122 
Education Level -0.0405 0.0014 -0.0267 
 -0.1534 -0.0709 -0.1332 
Soc-Econ Status -0.0738 0.0216 0.0682 
 -0.3765 -0.1775 -0.3186 
Income 0.1724 0.0443 -0.0205 
 -0.1722 -0.0811 -0.1345 
Community Size -0.0880 -0.0217 -.5295*** 
 -0.1099 -0.0505 -0.1190 
Constant -2.7169 -0.0153 -0.5642 
 -2.0174 -0.9371 -1.6756 
Log-Likelihood -374.9105   
Chi2 73.4407   
Pseudo R2 0.0892   
Base Category MSZP   
N 381   
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Of the two minor Hungarian parties, the vote for the liberal SZDSZ seems to be also best 
explained by positioning on the religious factor. However, like for minor parties in 
Austria, the vote for the agrarian FKGP is not predictable by issue-positioning at all. It is 
the size of the community inhabited that best predicts, where respondents from smaller 
localities are much more likely to support this party, underlining its rural character.    
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Table 10. Vote Probability Change - Hungary 
 MSZP SZDSZ Fidesz-MDF FKGP Change 
Social Moral Factor 0.1766 0.1456 -0.3616 0.0393 0.1808 
Religious Factor -0.4137 0.2073 0.1509 0.0554 0.2068 
Economic Factor 0.3259 -0.0675 -0.2722 0.0138 0.1699 
Age 0.1183 0.0181 -0.1899 0.0534 0.0949 
Education Level 0.0097 -0.0111 0.0100 -0.0086 0.0098 
Soc-Econ Status -0.0132 -0.0106 0.0146 0.0091 0.0119 
Income -0.1015 0.0600 0.0591 -0.0175 0.0595 
Community Size 0.1731 -0.0103 0.0649 -0.2277 0.1190 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ command 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Hungary 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social-moral factor spans from social 
conservatism to social liberalism, religious factor spans from secular to religious. Generated by 
                  Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
 
 
The results for countries with steep competition axes – Austria and Hungary – are not 
entirely consistent with the hypotheses set out above. They may, however, be plausibly 
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interpreted in the light of my theoretical propositions. The somewhat indistinct results for 
the major parties in Austria and Hungary – which seem to compete for votes on the basis 
of social as well as economic issues – are sensible. Although being relatively steep, the 
Austrian and Hungarian competition axis is not close to parallel to the social dimension 
(which would require the slope coefficient to approach infinity). While Austria and 
Hungary may present empirical extremes in the European context, they do not portray a 
theoretical extreme of polities competing solely along the social dimension – the way that 
Sweden and the Czech Republic competes along the economic one. The mixed relevance 
of social as well as economic factors for the vote choice for major parties in Austria and 
Hungary is thus a realistic representation of their competition axes, which slants between 
the two dimensions. Furthermore, the fact that the minor parties seem to generally attract 
votes on the basis of non-policy rather than policy placement is also consistent. Since the 
major parties compete on a mixture of social and economic factors, the minor parties 
need to differentiate themselves on other issues. The Austrian Grünen thus strive for 
partially competing on being the party of the educated, while the anti-system FPÖ attracts 
the poorly qualified youth with bleak prospects, and the Hungarian FKGP reaches out to 
voters in rural areas.   
 
  
V. Conclusion  
This paper has argued for the usefulness of the terms political space and axis of party 
competition in the conceptualization of political conflict. Redressing the shortcomings of 
spatial theory, these concepts allow the representation of political competition in a 
broader ideological perspective. The content of political competition – the political space 
– is derived with greater nuance, not limited to a single generic dimension, but allowing 
for small-n dimensionality. Consequently, the main line of political conflict – the axis of 
competition – is contextualized within the spatial dimensionality, allowing for the 
quantitative expression of its characteristics (slope and fit), which can then be compared 
across varying cases. This understanding is useful for the study of comparative politics in 
that it provides a summary measure of political competition, which may be used in 
broader analyses.  
 
This paper has demonstrated the applicability of these concepts by concentrating on 
contemporary party competition in European countries. Constructing a two-dimensional 
political space derived deductively from expert studies and placing political parties in it, 
has allowed the derivation of axes of party competition in different political systems of 
Europe. This exercise has subsequently outlined the broad variation on the slope of the 
axis of party competition, emphasizing that the nature of political conflict differs among 
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European countries – with some competing predominantly along an economic dimension, 
while others compete more along a social dimension.  
 
Finally, this paper has addressed the variation of competition axis slope by studying the 
interplay between partisan and electoral politics. It has argued that where the competition 
axis slope is flat, main competition occurs along the economic dimension and voters 
chose major parties predominantly on the basis of economic considerations. Where the 
axis slope is steep, main competition occurs increasingly along the social dimension and 
major parties are more likely to be selected based on social-issue considerations. The 
results have broadly supported these claims. In Sweden and the Czech Republic, where 
the competition axes run distinctly along the economic dimension, vote choice for the 
major parties is rooted in economic concerns. In Austria and Hungary, where the 
competition axes are much steeper, vote choice for the major parties is determined jointly 
by social and economic issues. This result is consistent with the logic of the argument. 
Since the Austrian and Hungarian competition axes run between the economic and social 
dimension, major parties compete on both dimensions. Minor parties in all countries 
compete more along secondary issues. The Czech KDU-!SL, as well as the Swedish 
Vänstrepartiet and Kristdemokraterna appeal to voters on social issues, while vote for the 
Hungarian FKGP and the Austrian FPÖ and Grünen seems to be best predicted by non-
policy issues, such as age, education and community size, suggesting that these parties 
attract voters on the basis of their agrarian, anti-systemic and alternative identity 
respectively, rather than on specific policy. This emphasizes the theoretical virtue of the 
concepts of political space and axis of competition and illustrates their meaningful 
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description of political competition in Europe, allowing for differentiation and 
comparison. At the same time, these results highlight an important weakness of this 
conceptualization – its incapacity to capture party competition completely, including non-
policy, as well as policy issues.    
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Appendix – Factor Analysis 
 
1. Sweden 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      700 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        8 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =       92 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.34102      0.17319            0.4133       0.4133 
        Factor2  |      1.16782      0.34214            0.3599       0.7732 
        Factor3  |      0.82568      0.06589            0.2545       1.0276 
        Factor4  |      0.75979      0.33550            0.2341       1.2618 
        Factor5  |      0.42429      0.36995            0.1308       1.3925 
        Factor6  |      0.05434      0.03383            0.0167       1.4093 
        Factor7  |      0.02051      0.01905            0.0063       1.4156 
        Factor8  |      0.00146            .            0.0004       1.4160 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(105) = 1423.86 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7   Factor8 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |  -0.1193   -0.0255    0.0110    0.5231    0.0169    0.0023   -0.0187   -0.0039 |      0.7107   
            b003 |   0.0527    0.1997    0.0960   -0.5479   -0.0803   -0.0112   -0.0144   -0.0041 |      0.6411   
            e037 |   0.5922   -0.0053    0.0596   -0.0984    0.0150   -0.0441    0.0363    0.0098 |      0.6325   
            e038 |   0.4959    0.0437   -0.0028   -0.0182   -0.2233    0.0774    0.0861    0.0023 |      0.6885   
            e039 |   0.5581   -0.0257   -0.0088   -0.0641   -0.0585   -0.0045   -0.0087   -0.0173 |      0.6799   
            e042 |   0.6086   -0.0429    0.0046   -0.0085    0.0217    0.0002   -0.0671    0.0033 |      0.6227   
            e143 |  -0.0804   -0.0921   -0.0155    0.2005    0.3681    0.0349   -0.0131    0.0019 |      0.8077   
            e145 |  -0.1741   -0.0545   -0.0730    0.1573    0.3361    0.0470    0.0489   -0.0079 |      0.8190   
            f028 |   0.0380    0.3189   -0.1843    0.1496    0.0393    0.0427   -0.0452    0.0277 |      0.8343   
            f103 |   0.0175   -0.0184    0.5995   -0.0093    0.0181    0.0164   -0.0235    0.0038 |      0.6387   
            f105 |   0.0223   -0.0795    0.6304   -0.0529   -0.0315   -0.0228    0.0197   -0.0035 |      0.5911   
            f118 |  -0.0174    0.6219    0.0119   -0.2031   -0.1139   -0.0541   -0.0002   -0.0002 |      0.5557   
            f120 |  -0.0175    0.6648   -0.0815   -0.0074    0.0189    0.0408    0.0030   -0.0008 |      0.5491   
            f122 |  -0.0663    0.3315   -0.0951    0.2003    0.0870    0.1646    0.0012    0.0020 |      0.8019   
            f126 |   0.0391    0.2541   -0.0233    0.0128   -0.3022    0.0923    0.0329   -0.0124 |      0.8321   
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Factor rotation matrix 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  Factor7  Factor8  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.8309   0.1865   0.1485  -0.4109  -0.2889  -0.0208   0.0122  -0.0009  
         Factor2 | -0.2290   0.8949  -0.3437  -0.1011  -0.1185   0.0657  -0.0014   0.0042  
         Factor3 |  0.4454  -0.0959  -0.7270   0.4868   0.1479   0.0706  -0.0026   0.0063  
         Factor4 |  0.2061   0.3608   0.5749   0.6787   0.1471   0.1200  -0.0082   0.0064  
         Factor5 |  0.1264   0.1313   0.0270  -0.3250   0.9250  -0.0406  -0.0554   0.0122  
         Factor6 | -0.0176  -0.0771   0.0093  -0.1250   0.0324   0.9129   0.3771  -0.0372  
         Factor7 |  0.0069   0.0418  -0.0018   0.0447   0.0484  -0.3750   0.9218  -0.0592  
         Factor8 |  0.0042   0.0073  -0.0024   0.0054   0.0089  -0.0108  -0.0695  -0.9974  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
2. Czech Republic 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1245 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        7 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =       98 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.47256      0.16278            0.3538       0.3538 
        Factor2  |      1.30978      0.06704            0.3147       0.6685 
        Factor3  |      1.24274      0.42644            0.2986       0.9672 
        Factor4  |      0.81631      0.37177            0.1961       1.1633 
        Factor5  |      0.44454      0.21565            0.1068       1.2701 
        Factor6  |      0.22890      0.09766            0.0550       1.3251 
        Factor7  |      0.13123            .            0.0315       1.3566 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(136) = 3598.72 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |   0.0245    0.0574    0.0781   -0.0772   -0.4022    0.0606    0.0563 |      0.8154   
            b003 |   0.0754   -0.1094   -0.1722    0.0784    0.4520    0.0696    0.0602 |      0.7337   
            e035 |   0.1591   -0.2552   -0.1915   -0.0385    0.0976    0.2220    0.0043 |      0.8126   
            e036 |  -0.0650    0.6100    0.2699   -0.0211   -0.0027   -0.0630   -0.0360 |      0.5451   
            e037 |  -0.0617    0.4485    0.4757    0.0274   -0.1501    0.0491   -0.0117 |      0.5430   
            e038 |   0.1029    0.0887    0.1803    0.1300    0.0324    0.2992    0.0621 |      0.8377   
            e039 |  -0.0806    0.5421    0.1491    0.0759   -0.0690    0.1489    0.0238 |      0.6442   
            e042 |  -0.0464    0.4770    0.3001   -0.0189    0.0018   -0.1229    0.0130 |      0.6646   
            e043 |  -0.0222    0.2257    0.5876   -0.0025   -0.1018   -0.0266   -0.0149 |      0.5920   
            e044 |  -0.0058    0.2297    0.6045    0.0095    0.0193    0.0272    0.0030 |      0.5806   
            f028 |   0.3513    0.0158    0.1071   -0.1901    0.0021   -0.0025   -0.1854 |      0.7943   
            f103 |  -0.0958    0.0169    0.0086    0.6044    0.0315    0.0166   -0.0176 |      0.6236   
            f105 |  -0.0766    0.0119    0.0096    0.6066    0.0308    0.0054    0.0273 |      0.6242   
            f118 |   0.5865   -0.1213   -0.0508   -0.0169    0.1356    0.1057    0.1611 |      0.5830   
            f120 |   0.7136   -0.0592   -0.0274   -0.0835   -0.0423   -0.0009   -0.0165 |      0.4775   
            f122 |   0.5923    0.0137   -0.0026   -0.0395    0.0044   -0.0409   -0.0786 |      0.6396   
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            f126 |   0.2659   -0.0647   -0.0288    0.0150    0.0876    0.1527    0.2244 |      0.8427   
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  Factor7  
    -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor1 | -0.3437   0.6710   0.6244   0.0735  -0.1816  -0.0449  -0.0359  
         Factor2 |  0.8731   0.1880   0.3102  -0.3153  -0.0374   0.0724   0.0019  
         Factor3 |  0.2704   0.0670   0.0791   0.8802   0.2876   0.2041   0.1306  
         Factor4 | -0.0851   0.3945  -0.1859  -0.2790   0.8484   0.0197   0.0673  
         Factor5 | -0.1730  -0.5691   0.6554  -0.1502   0.3247   0.2654   0.1353  
         Factor6 | -0.0922   0.1733  -0.2056  -0.1416  -0.2368   0.7915   0.4654  
         Factor7 | -0.0264   0.0177  -0.0360   0.0078   0.0404   0.5038  -0.8615  
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3. Austria 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1092 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        9 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =      135 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.66060      0.13679            0.3942       0.3942 
        Factor2  |      1.52381      0.53473            0.3617       0.7560 
        Factor3  |      0.98908      0.28147            0.2348       0.9908 
        Factor4  |      0.70760      0.28457            0.1680       1.1587 
        Factor5  |      0.42304      0.07063            0.1004       1.2592 
        Factor6  |      0.35241      0.21534            0.0837       1.3428 
        Factor7  |      0.13707      0.10323            0.0325       1.3754 
        Factor8  |      0.03384      0.00902            0.0080       1.3834 
        Factor9  |      0.02481            .            0.0059       1.3893 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(171) = 3085.20 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7   Factor8   Factor9 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |  -0.0518   -0.0042   -0.1432    0.4886   -0.0375    0.0432   -0.0041    0.0200    0.0032 |      0.7343   
            b003 |   0.0968   -0.0632    0.1936   -0.4735    0.0530   -0.0369   -0.0144    0.0204   -0.0036 |      0.7201   
            e035 |   0.1217   -0.0592    0.0665   -0.0922    0.2077    0.0986   -0.0175    0.0151    0.1330 |      0.8977   
            e036 |  -0.0086    0.5090    0.0556    0.0139    0.1067    0.0646   -0.0926    0.0847    0.0278 |      0.7055   
            e037 |   0.0281    0.5321    0.0278    0.0112   -0.0372   -0.0421    0.1259   -0.0348   -0.0175 |      0.6947   
            e038 |   0.1640    0.1912    0.0518   -0.1481    0.4357   -0.1296    0.0074    0.0045    0.0001 |      0.7052   
            e039 |   0.0148    0.4656    0.1071    0.0308    0.2105    0.0614   -0.1436   -0.0312   -0.0435 |      0.6990   
            e042 |  -0.0714    0.5388    0.0690    0.0097   -0.0781    0.0239   -0.1118   -0.0226    0.0206 |      0.6797   
            e043 |   0.0282    0.4411   -0.0418    0.0467   -0.0046   -0.0474    0.1935   -0.0034   -0.0027 |      0.7610   
            e044 |   0.1691    0.4614    0.0545    0.0076    0.1173   -0.1106    0.1689    0.0186   -0.0176 |      0.7003   
            e143 |  -0.1425    0.0786   -0.0201    0.3400   -0.1733    0.2273   -0.0215    0.0089   -0.0457 |      0.7732   
            e145 |  -0.1336   -0.0106   -0.0794    0.1822   -0.0922    0.3563    0.0092    0.0026    0.0144 |      0.8068   
            f028 |   0.4185    0.0235   -0.2685    0.0725   -0.0047   -0.0412    0.0470    0.1292    0.0116 |      0.7263   
            f103 |  -0.1216    0.0553    0.6271   -0.0578    0.0304   -0.0344   -0.0029    0.0101    0.0178 |      0.5830   
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            f105 |  -0.1178    0.0657    0.6298   -0.0946    0.0069    0.0056   -0.0006   -0.0088   -0.0152 |      0.5758   
            f118 |   0.6364   -0.0382   -0.0036   -0.1468    0.1499   -0.1294    0.0344   -0.0389    0.0142 |      0.5298   
            f120 |   0.6806    0.0162   -0.1606   -0.0019    0.0114    0.0070    0.0019    0.0389   -0.0110 |      0.5089   
            f122 |   0.5576    0.0755   -0.0617    0.0261   -0.1057    0.0868   -0.0588   -0.0491    0.0073 |      0.6543   
            f126 |   0.3875    0.0362    0.0292   -0.1485    0.1885   -0.3034    0.0746    0.0125   -0.0048 |      0.6923   
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  Factor7  Factor8  Factor9  
    -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor1 |  0.8688   0.2568  -0.1331  -0.2261   0.2418  -0.2178   0.0629   0.0205   0.0112  
         Factor2 | -0.2424   0.8475   0.4459  -0.0534   0.1420  -0.0257   0.0100  -0.0114  -0.0128  
         Factor3 |  0.0486   0.4167  -0.6156   0.5923  -0.2100   0.2204   0.0203   0.0249  -0.0234  
         Factor4 |  0.4285  -0.0906   0.5936   0.3667  -0.3725   0.4080  -0.1254  -0.0174   0.0023  
         Factor5 | -0.0057  -0.1775   0.1924   0.6552   0.6383  -0.2906   0.0872   0.0502   0.0155  
         Factor6 | -0.0066  -0.0092  -0.1191  -0.1405   0.5291   0.6263  -0.5263   0.0302   0.1263  
         Factor7 | -0.0048  -0.0385   0.0158  -0.0986   0.1844   0.4881   0.8294   0.0848   0.1454  
         Factor8 | -0.0164   0.0132   0.0255  -0.0123  -0.0993  -0.0816  -0.0776   0.9471   0.2816  
         Factor9 |  0.0068  -0.0253   0.0063  -0.0428   0.0857   0.1238   0.0356   0.3016  -0.9394  
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Hungary 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      558 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        6 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =       75 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.25336      0.22729            0.4361       0.4361 
        Factor2  |      1.02607      0.19552            0.3570       0.7932 
        Factor3  |      0.83054      0.38441            0.2890       1.0822 
        Factor4  |      0.44613      0.05607            0.1552       1.2374 
        Factor5  |      0.39006      0.10474            0.1357       1.3731 
        Factor6  |      0.28532            .            0.0993       1.4724 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(105) = 1002.63 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |  -0.0150    0.0079    0.0984    0.0322    0.0929    0.3438 |      0.8621   
            b003 |   0.0762    0.0450   -0.1414   -0.0509   -0.0905   -0.3127 |      0.8636   
            e037 |  -0.0926    0.0088    0.5695    0.0266    0.0215    0.1016 |      0.6555   
            e038 |   0.0859   -0.0379    0.2613    0.1004   -0.3139   -0.0373 |      0.8129   
            e039 |  -0.0389    0.0976    0.3139   -0.0567   -0.1037   -0.1882 |      0.8410   
            e042 |  -0.0979    0.0112    0.4633   -0.0328    0.1145   -0.0485 |      0.7591   
            e143 |  -0.2291    0.0591    0.2060   -0.0058    0.3764    0.0860 |      0.7525   
            e145 |  -0.2130    0.0221    0.1891    0.0700    0.3118    0.0731 |      0.8109   
            f028 |   0.0975   -0.2978    0.0713    0.3170   -0.0515    0.0693 |      0.7888   
            f103 |  -0.1139    0.6666   -0.0223   -0.0644    0.0164   -0.0219 |      0.5373   
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            f105 |   0.0675    0.6623    0.0491   -0.0255    0.0044    0.0150 |      0.5535   
            f118 |   0.6836   -0.0169   -0.0820    0.0650   -0.0288   -0.0067 |      0.5205   
            f120 |   0.3353   -0.1512   -0.0362    0.4093    0.0383    0.0357 |      0.6931   
            f122 |   0.2505   -0.1167    0.0228    0.3775   -0.0401   -0.0094 |      0.7789   
            f126 |   0.6729   -0.0206   -0.0176    0.0538   -0.0680   -0.0129 |      0.5388   
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.7835  -0.4076  -0.2760   0.3074  -0.2182  -0.0405  
         Factor2 | -0.2928  -0.7774   0.4382   0.2448   0.1577   0.1820  
         Factor3 |  0.4020   0.3915   0.7897   0.2302   0.0208   0.0899  
         Factor4 |  0.0816   0.1689  -0.2970   0.3079   0.6825   0.5621  
         Factor5 | -0.3630   0.2183  -0.1413   0.8022  -0.3933  -0.0495  
         Factor6 |  0.0187  -0.0070   0.0024   0.2330   0.5537  -0.7992  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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